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IN RE SIMON SHIAO TAM, A CONCURRING OPINION:
SECTION 1052(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT IMPOSES AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION NO LONGER JUSTIFIED
BY CONGRESS’ SPENDING POWER
Francis A. Raso*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Simon Shiao Tam is the lead singer, songwriter, and “front-man”
of an Asian American rock band that controversially refers to itself as
“The Slants.”1 Mr. Tam seeks federal trademark registration for the
moniker, which he regularly utilizes in promotional materials.2 His
stated intent is a desire to recapture the negative stereotypes typically
associated with Asian American culture, and to redefine them in a
more positive light—as sources of Asian pride and accomplishment.3
But Mr. Tam’s efforts to seek semiotic change were thwarted when an
examining attorney in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) refused to register his mark because the term would likely
disparage a “substantial composite” of the Asian American
population.4 The examining attorney cited § 1052(a) of the Lanham
* J.D., 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Journalism and Public
Relations, 2013, Seton Hall University. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Healy
for lending me his constitutional expertise and providing me with valuable feedback
throughout the writing of this Comment. I would also like to thank Kyle Brown for all
of his helpful guidance and encouragement.
1
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 568 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
2
See id.
3
See id. at 570. Mr. Tam is one of dozens of trademark applicants who have set
forth similar reasoning in support of their potentially disparaging trademarks. See
Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. Murphy, Calling Bullshit on the Lanham Act: The 2(a)
Bar for Immoral, Scandalous, and Disparaging Marks, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465, 476–
77 (2011) (“Currently, there are many groups attempting to take once derogatory
terms and internalize them, make them their own, and in the process strip them of
hateful meaning.”); see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the
Immoral and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 219 (2005) (describing “semiotic sovereignty,” a process by
which disenfranchised communities seek empowerment by transforming offensive
pejoratives into symbols of pride).
4
See Tam, 785 F.3d at 568–69.
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Act as statutory grounds for the refusal.5
Section 1052(a) allows the PTO to refuse to register a trademark
consisting of “immoral,” “disparaging,” or “scandalous” subject
matter.6 The PTO frequently cites this provision when declining to
register the marks of applicants who strive to combat prejudice by
using their products and/or services to redefine cultural stereotypes.7
Prior to In re Tam, the longstanding Federal Circuit precedent of In re
McGinley upheld the constitutionality of § 1052(a) against First
Amendment challenge, reasoning that the PTO’s refusal to grant
trademark registration does not infringe upon an applicant’s First
Amendment right to nevertheless use the mark in commerce.8 The
McGinley decision has since been the subject of widespread, biting
criticism.9
Mr. Tam appealed the PTO’s decision, and the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the examiner’s refusal, citing
dictionary definitions, other reference works, and reactions from the
community as evidence of likely disparagement.10 The Federal Circuit
initially reaffirmed the Board’s decision, but subsequently vacated its
5

Id. at 568.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2015).
7
See, e.g., In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (rejecting
registration of the mark, “HEEB,” despite the fact that the founders of Heeb Magazine—
a monthly periodical aimed primarily at Jewish readers—hoped to “revitalize American
Jewish life” and “transvalue the term ‘heeb’ from an epithet into a term of Jewish
empowerment”). In 2003, a PTO examiner rejected the San Francisco Women’s
Motorcycle Contingent’s application for the proposed mark “DYKES ON BIKES” on
grounds that the mark would likely offend members of the lesbian community. U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 78281746 (filed July 31, 2003). Since as early as
1976, this group has actively participated in countless parades and other events
promoting homosexual pride. Id.
8
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
9
See, e.g., Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J.,
dissenting); Stephen Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the
Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 685–86
(1993); Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark:
Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words That Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L.
REV. 415, 443–44 (2001); Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction
on Sports Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS L. J. 65, 66–67
(1997); Ron Phillips, A Case for Scandal and Immorality: Proposing Thin Protection of
Controversial Trademarks, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 67–68 (2008); Jendi Reiter,
Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why “Immoral” and “Scandalous” Trademarks Should Be Federally
Registrable, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 197 (1996); see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1333–34 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (“[T]he McGinley analysis was cursory . . . and decided
at a time when the First Amendment had only recently been applied to commercial
speech. First Amendment jurisprudence on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
and the protection accorded to commercial speech has evolved significantly since the
McGinley decision.”).
10
Tam, 785 F.3d at 569.
6
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judgment and granted Mr. Tam a rehearing en banc on the sole issue:
Does § 1052(a) violate the First Amendment?11
Upon rehearing, the Federal Circuit vacated its earlier judgment,
partially overruled McGinley, struck down § 1052(a)’s disparagement
provision as facially unconstitutional, and permitted Mr. Tam to
register his trademark.12 The court reaffirmed McGinley’s proposition
that § 1052(a) does not technically ban any speech.13 However, the
court held the provision imposes an “unconstitutional condition”
because it deprives disparaging marks of vitally important business
protections, thereby discouraging trademark applicants from using
offensive language.14 The court also ruled that the statutory language
is viewpoint-discriminatory on its face (and therefore presumptively
invalid) because the PTO’s exclusion of a mark from the Principal
Register necessarily depends on its disapproval of the mark’s
message15—a direct violation of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
mandating content neutrality in government restraints on speech.16
The Federal Circuit further held that § 1052(a)’s disparagement
prohibition could not be saved by either the “commercial speech” or
“government speech” doctrines.17 Regarding the former, the court
reasoned it is not the mark’s commercial nature as a source identifier,
but rather its “expressive character” that serves as the basis for an
unregistrability finding.18 With respect to the latter, the court held that
a trademark owner’s use of his or her mark is private speech rather than
government speech.19 The court reasoned that the purpose of
identifying a business owner’s goods is highly antithetical to any notion
of government control,20 and that neither the regulatory activity of
issuing a registration certificate nor the trademark owner’s inclusion
of an “®” symbol converts this speech from private to government
status.21
11

In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacating 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir.

2015).
12

See generally Tam, 808 F.3d at 1321.
See id. at 1339–40.
14
See id. at 1339–45.
15
Id. at 1334–37.
16
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Police Dep’t of Chi.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
17
See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337–38, 1345.
18
Id. at 1337–38.
19
Id. at 1345.
20
See id. at 1345 (“The fact that COCA COLA and PEPSI may be registered
trademarks does not mean the government has endorsed these brands of cola, or
prefers them over other brands.”).
21
Id. at 1347.
13
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Finally, the court held Congress may not exclude disparaging
trademarks from the Principal Register on the ground that registration
constitutes a government subsidy.22 Even though “the scope of the
subsidy cases has never been extended to a ‘benefit’ like recognition
of legal rights in speakers against private interference,”23 the court
seemed to assume arguendo that federal registration constitutes a
subsidy. Nevertheless, the court held that Congress does not remain
“free to distribute the legal rights it creates without respecting First
Amendment limits on content and viewpoint discrimination.”24
The Federal Circuit’s recent grant of a rehearing in In re Tam
demonstrates the questionable status of § 1052(a). While the Federal
Circuit seems to have taken a definitive position on the provision’s
constitutionality, the issue remains heated in other jurisdictions due to
the PTO’s cancellation of allegedly disparaging trademarks affiliated
with discriminatory sports team names.25 For this reason, the United
States Supreme Court granted the federal government’s petition for
writ of certiorari in September 2016.26 Additionally, the Federal
Circuit’s en banc opinion expressly limits its holding to § 1052(a)’s
disparagement prohibition, thereby leaving all constitutional issues
regarding the statute’s parallel scandalousness prohibition wide open
for further debate—even within the Federal Circuit’s domain.27
At first glance, there are two policy implications underlying §
1052(a)’s statutory language that seem particularly troubling. First,
the provision serves as an inviting vehicle through which PTO
22

Id. at 1353.
Tam, 808 F.3d at 1351.
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015);
see also Eugene Volokh, Federal Appeals Court Decides ‘The Slants’ Case: Excluding
‘Disparaging Marks’ from Trademark Registration Violates the First Amendment, WASH. POST
(Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2015/12/22/federal-appeals-court-decides-the-slants-case-excluding-disparagingmarks-from-trademark-registration-violates-the-first-amendment/ (explaining that the
Tam decision is not binding on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is currently
considering the continued registrability of the “REDSKINS” mark).
26
Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Will Hear ‘Slants’ Trademark Case, Which Is Directly
Relevant to the Redskins Controversy, WASH. POST. (Sep. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2016/09/29/supreme-court-will-hear-slants-trademark-case-which-isdirectly-relevant-to-the-redskins-controversy/?utm_term=.71ae766fbbc1.
27
Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 n.1; see also Lawrence K. Nodine & Daniel B. Englander,
In re Tam En Banc Decision—Lanham Act 2(a) Is Unconstitutional, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/201512-22-in-re-tam-en-banc-decision-lanham-act-2-a-is-unconstitutional.aspx (“Although
the Court did not rule that . . . other aspects of the statute were also unconstitutional,
it nonetheless made clear that it was open to future challenges to these provisions.”).
23
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examining attorneys may enforce their own subjective ideas of
morality—a temptation that exists nowhere else within United States
intellectual property law.28 In short, the PTO possesses admirable
expertise in several areas, but it does not possess the ability to assess
and measure the public’s moral outrage.29 Imposing such an
unreasonable duty on the PTO compels individual examiners to tap
into their own political views, religious backgrounds, geographic
origins, and unique visceral reactions, thereby producing
irreconcilably inconsistent results.30
The second troublesome policy implication regarding § 1052(a)
is that its prohibitions are fundamentally inconsistent with the Lanham
Act’s underlying purposes: to eliminate “deceptive” and “misleading”
trademarks from interstate commerce; to protect registrants against
“unfair competition”; and to prevent commercial “fraud.”31 Other
sections and subsections of the Lanham Act more appropriately reflect
these goals.32 However, the prohibition of scandalous and/or
disparaging trademark registrations is entirely disconnected from
these concerns. Offensive marks do not necessarily confuse consumers
or stimulate unfair competition; they also have the potential to acquire
28

See Phillips, supra note 9, at 56 (“It seems peculiar to call upon the United States
Patent and Trademark Office to monitor and protect the morals of society—these sorts
of police powers have historically been the domain of states and explicitly not the
domain of the federal government.”). The free market itself would likely be a more
appropriate judge of a trademark’s value as a source indicator. See id. No equivalent
morality standard exists in American copyright or patent law; in fact, both of these
regimes explicitly offer protection for controversial and potentially offensive works.
See id. at 71. For example, the United States Copyright Office lacks authority to deny
copyright registration to a pornographic magazine, provided the magazine constitutes
an “original work of authorship” fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (2015). Additionally, the PTO demonstrated its lack of concern for morality as
a criterion of patentability when it issued a patent for a “female functional” mannequin
in 1995. Phillips, supra note 9, at 71 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,466,235 (filed Mar. 27,
1995)).
29
Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May
Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1477 (2011).
30
Id. at 1476–77.
31
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2015). Subsequent case law has identified additional
purposes, including: to lessen consumer search costs; to ensure manufacturers reap
the goodwill of their investments; to identify and distinguish a seller’s goods from
others; and to enable consumers to make decisions based on previous experiences with
a particular product. Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 466 (citing Barton Beebe,
The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (2004)); Robert
Wright, Today’s Scandal Can Be Tomorrow’s Vogue: Why Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Is
Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness, 48 HOW. L.J. 659, 660 (2005).
32
See, e.g., § 1052(d) (granting the PTO authority to deny registration for marks
that strongly resemble other previously registered marks and marks that are otherwise
likely to cause consumer confusion).

RASO (DO NOT DELETE)

940

4/16/2017 1:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:935

goodwill and serve as effective source identifiers.33 In sum, the Lanham
Act’s purposes strongly suggest that registration prohibitions should
exist only to the extent necessary to reduce consumer confusion.34
In light of the foregoing policy and the following legal analysis,
this Comment posits that the Federal Circuit’s resolution of Tam was
correct, and the United States Supreme Court should affirm the
decision. Ultimately, § 1052(a)’s scandalousness and disparagement
prohibitions should both be struck down as violative of the First
Amendment. As opposed to focusing on the viewpoint-discriminatory
nature of § 1052(a)’s prohibitions, this Comment attacks McGinley
through an analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as that
doctrine interacts with Congress’s Article I spending power. Because
McGinley failed to even consider the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in its analysis, its ruling that § 1052(a) survives First
Amendment scrutiny fails to suffice as viable precedent.35 More
importantly, the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution no
longer justifies § 1052(a)’s intrusive restrictions on speech. This latter
point has little to do with the provision’s content- or viewpointdiscrimination, and the Federal Circuit need not have engaged in a
complex First Amendment analysis to dismiss the government’s
“permissible non-subsidy” argument. Rather, drastic changes in the
PTO’s structure36 have rendered McGinley obsolete, and federal
trademark registration proceedings no longer implicate public
treasury funds to a constitutionally adequate degree. In other words,
even if § 1052(a)’s prohibitions were content-neutral, McGinley’s
proposition that the Spending Clause grants Congress the power to
withhold federal trademark registrations is incorrect, because the
issuance of such a registration does not in any way constitute a
33

LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1487.
See Jasmine Abdel-Khalik, To Live in In-”Fame”-Y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks
as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173, 180 (2007) (citing J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:14 (4th
ed. 2006)).
35
See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 580 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en
banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom.
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
36
See id. (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)) (citing
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990); Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,142-01 (Dec. 13, 1991)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 2)) (“[T]he act of registering a trademark does not
involve the federal treasury. In 1981, as noted by the McGinley court, trademark
registration was ‘underwritten by public funds.’ That is no longer true today. Since
1991, PTO operations have been funded entirely by registration fees, not the
taxpayer.”).
34
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government subsidy.
Part II of this Comment summarizes necessary background
information regarding how § 1052(a) operates in practice. Part III
includes a brief description of the constitutional challenges that have
been raised as prior attempts to invalidate the provision on its face.
Part IV argues § 1052(a) imposes an unconstitutional condition that
unlawfully abridges trademark applicants’ First Amendment rights.
Part V asserts § 1052(a)’s First Amendment intrusion is no longer
justified by Congress’s Article I spending power. Finally, Part VI argues
that as an abridgement of trademark applicants’ First Amendment
rights to engage in offensive commercial speech, § 1052(a) must
withstand a form of intermediate scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York; the provision
fails to survive this scrutiny, and it therefore must be invalidated as
unconstitutional.
II. BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF
SECTION 1052(a)
A. The Procedural Mechanisms Governing Section 1052(a) Rejections
and Appeals
Either a group or an individual may submit an application for
federal trademark registration to the PTO.37 The application is then
assigned to an examining attorney who confirms the applicant has
complied with procedural formalities and determines whether the
mark overcomes any relevant substantive statutory prohibitions.38 At
this stage, the examiner can decide the proposed mark consists of
“scandalous” or “disparaging” material and refuse registration on
those grounds.39 If this occurs, the denied applicant is given six months
to amend his or her application, present evidence countering the
examiner’s finding, or otherwise respond with legal arguments.40
Following a final office action, a rejected applicant may appeal to the
TTAB.41 If the applicant is again denied registration, he or she may
submit an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.42 Via this route, a registration denial can make its way to the
37

See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2015).
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 704.01 (5th ed. 2007); Wright,
supra note 31, at 667 (citing § 1062(b)).
39
See § 1052(a).
40
See § 1062(b); Wright, supra note 31, at 667–68.
41
§ 1070.
42
See § 1071.
38
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United States Supreme Court.43
By contrast, if the PTO examiner approves the application, the
PTO publishes notice in The Trademark Official Gazette,44 and the public
has thirty days to oppose the mark’s registration.45 If no members of
the public submit an opposition within thirty days, the PTO issues the
applicant a certificate of registration.46 Once an applicant receives this
certificate, all protections afforded by the registration are effective. A
trademark owner who demonstrates five years of consistent postregistration commercial use acquires an “incontestable” right to
continue using the mark in interstate commerce.47
This
“incontestable” status is somewhat of a misnomer, however, because a
third party who believes he or she will be damaged by a trademark’s
scandalous or disparaging qualities may still initiate a TTAB
cancellation proceeding at any time following the mark’s registration.48
B. The “Scandalousness” and “Disparagement” Tests
Although § 1052(a)’s literal language sets forth four separate
prohibitions against “immoral,” “deceptive,” “scandalous,” and
“disparaging” subject matter,49 the PTO and courts alike have lumped
§ 1052(a) challenges into two broadly inclusive categories: those
asserting scandalousness and those asserting disparagement.
Courts have defined “scandalous” marks as marks containing
subject matter that is “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or
propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the
conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or] calling out [for]
condemnation.”50 Whether a proposed trademark contains scandalous
subject matter is to be determined from the perspective of “not
necessarily a majority, but a substantial composite of the general
public.”51 Courts make such a determination in the context of
43

Wright, supra note 31, at 669.
37 C.F.R. § 2.80 (2006).
45
Regan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and
Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 455 (2007).
46
Id. at 454–55.
47
§ 1065.
48
See Smith, supra note 45, at 455.
49
§ 1052(a).
50
In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re
Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938)). Alternatively, the PTO can
establish scandalousness by showing that a mark is “vulgar.” See In re Boulevard Entm’t,
Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
51
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981). In Tam, the Federal Circuit
attached little significance to the PTO’s attempt at objectivity through the “substantial
composite” standard. Instead, the court noted that viewpoint discrimination is
44
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“contemporary attitudes.”52 Generally speaking, courts have grouped
“scandalous” trademarks into eight distinct categories: (1) marks
having religious significance;53 (2) marks containing problematic
political imagery;54 (3) marks containing sexual innuendo or sexually
graphic imagery;55 (4) marks containing profanity;56 (5) marks
implicating illegal substances or activities;57 (6) marks containing slang
terminology;58 (7) marks containing references to violence;59 and (8)
marks
implicating
one’s
sexual
orientation.60
unlawful regardless of whether the government itself disapproves of the message or
posits that some other part of the populace will disapprove of the message. In re Tam,
808 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61
(2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414 (1989)).
52
Mavety Media, 33 F.3d at 1371 (citing In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1219 (T.T.A.B. 1993)).
53
See, e.g., Riverbank Canning, 95 F.2d 327, 329 (barring the mark “MADONNA”
from registration for wines because members of the Christian faith would likely find
the association scandalous); see also In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (barring registration of the mark “SENUSSI” for
cigarettes because the name represents a sect of Muslim culture in which tobacco is
forbidden for religious reasons).
54
See, e.g., Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (Dec. Comm’r
Pat. 1938) (barring registration of the mark “QUEEN MARY” for women’s
undergarments); see also Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1216 (overturning a PTO
examiner’s final refusal to register a condom design featuring traditional American
stars and stripes).
55
See, e.g., McGinley, 660 F.2d at 485–87 (barring registration of an image depicting
a nude couple kissing and embracing); see also Ex parte Parfum L’Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 481 (P.T.O. 1952) (overturning a PTO examining attorney’s refusal to register
the mark “LIBIDO” for perfume scents).
56
See, e.g., In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (barring
registration of the mark “BULLSHIT” for clothing). But see In re Leo Quan, Inc., 200
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (permitting registration of the mark “BADASS”
for stringed instruments); see also In re Big Effin Garage, L.L.C., Serial No. 77595225,
2010 TTAB LEXIS 418 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2010) (permitting registration of the mark
“BIG EFFIN GARAGE” for online music communities).
57
See, e.g., Letter from Edward Fennessy, Trademark Examining Attorney, U.S.
PTO, to James A. Robb, Trademark Applicant, Serial No. 85,038,867 (Aug. 28, 2010)
(barring registration of the mark “KO KANE” for alcoholic drinks because a substantial
composite of the general public would likely interpret the mark as glamorizing drug
abuse).
58
See, e.g., In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (barring
registration of the mark “BUBBY TRAP” for brassieres).
59
See e.g., In re Love Bottling Co., Serial No. 78171270, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 261
(T.T.A.B. June 22, 2005) (barring registration of the mark “WIFE BEATER” for male
tank tops); Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,400,213
(P.T.O. Nov. 18, 2004) (barring registration of the mark “BABY Al QUAEDA” for tshirts).
60
See, e.g., Office Action for U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,281,746
(Feb. 28, 2004, revised Oct. 28, 2004) (barring registration of the mark “DYKES ON
BIKES” for the San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent), overruled by
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By contrast, a “disparaging” mark is one that “dishonors by
comparison with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or
affects or injures by unjust comparison.”61 The TTAB articulated the
seminal two-part test for disparagement in 1999.62 First, the court or
tribunal must consider dictionary evidence, the relationship of the
proposed mark’s elements, and the relevant segment of the
marketplace to determine the mark’s likely meaning.63 Second, the
court must determine whether a substantial composite of the relevant
public will perceive that meaning as disparaging.64
The disparagement test can be distinguished from the
scandalousness test in three significant ways. First, “while a trademark
must be scandalous to be denied, registration can be denied if a
trademark may be disparaging.”65 In practice, this variation means
challengers asserting disparagement are required to satisfy a lesser
burden of proof than challengers asserting scandalousness under
identical circumstances. Second, while there are certain situations in
which a mark may be assessed for scandalousness using only dictionary
evidence,66 the disparagement test requires a further examination of
the relevant market segment as well as the allegedly disparaged group’s
culture.67 Third, rather than depending on the perspective of a
substantial composite of the general public, disparagement is “evaluated
from the perspective of a substantial composite of the demographic on
which the mark is commenting . . . .”68
In making a § 1052(a) determination of scandalousness or
disparagement, courts have relied on dictionary definitions, opinion
surveys, marketing strategies, newspaper articles, Internet forums,
McDermott v. S.F. Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1212 (T.T.A.B.
2006).
61
In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
62
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1736 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
63
Id. at 1738–39.
64
Id. at 1736.
65
Smith, supra note 45, at 464 (emphasis added).
66
See In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding
that when “multiple dictionaries . . . uniformly indicate that a word is vulgar, and the
applicant’s use of the word is clearly limited to the vulgar meaning of the word, . . . the
PTO can sustain its burden of showing that the mark comprises or consists of
scandalous matter by reference to dictionary definitions alone”), abrogated by In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
67
See Smith, supra note 45, at 464.
68
Gibbons, supra note 3, at 212 (emphasis added); see In re Heeb Media, L.L.C.,
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (summarizing government’s argument
that the term, “heeb,” is a “highly disparaging reference to Jewish people, that it retains
this meaning when used in connection with the applicant’s goods and services, and
that a substantial composite of the referenced group finds it to be disparaging”).
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blogs, and expert witness testimonies.69 Dictionary definitions are the
most common form of evidence utilized in § 1052(a) proceedings,70
and there are some circumstances in which a PTO examining attorney
can rely solely on dictionary definitions to reject an application.71
Opinion surveys, by contrast, are expensive and time-consuming; as
such, courts rarely utilize this form of evidence in scandalousness
determinations, where it is not required.72
C. Third-Party Standing to Challenge a Registered Trademark
The test for standing in trademark cancellation proceedings is
unusually generous to third parties.73 This is because the TTAB relies
on third party challenges as a means of enforcing § 1052(a)’s
prohibitions.74 Acknowledging the “somewhat vague” and “highly
subjective” qualities of § 1052(a)’s standards,75 the TTAB has stated it
generally resolves doubts concerning a mark’s registrability in favor of
the applicant.76 The understanding is that if a significant segment of
the public later finds the mark to be scandalous or disparaging, then a
third party can institute an action, and the TTAB will have the
opportunity to compile a more complete record.77
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court articulated the
customary requirements for standing under Article III of the
Constitution:
Over the years, our cases have established that the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains
three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) “actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . the[e] result [of] the independent action of some
69

See Lalonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1498–1507.
See Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d at 1340 (“[D]ictionary definitions represent an
effort to distill the collective understanding of the community with respect to language
and thus clearly constitute more than a reflection of the individual views of either the
examining attorney or the dictionary editors.”).
71
See supra note 66.
72
Smith, supra note 45, at 461.
73
Id. at 456.
74
See In re Over Our Heads, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1654–55 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
75
In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
76
See, e.g., Over Our Heads, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1654.
77
Id. at 1654–55.
70
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third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,”
as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be
“redressed by a favorable decision.”78
Notwithstanding the usual Article III requirements, a party asserting a
§ 1052(a) challenge is not required to have a “specific commercial
interest[] not shared by the general public.”79 Rather, any party who
believes he or she is (or would be) “damaged” by the trademark at issue
may file a formal opposition with the PTO prior to the mark’s
registration or a formal petition for cancellation with the TTAB at any
time following the mark’s registration.80 A challenger may satisfy this
lenient standard by (1) showing he possesses a particular characteristic
directly implicated by the allegedly scandalous or disparaging mark; or
(2) showing—through surveys, petitions, and/or affidavits from public
interest groups—that other members of the general public share his
belief in the potential for widespread emotional or psychological
harm.81
As one can imagine, the Act’s generous standing requirement is
problematic in practice. This is because the Act “effectively allows
small special interest groups to curtail others’ speech, raising the risk
that trademarks are governed by political correctness rather than free
speech values.”82 As noted above, a third party has the ability not only
to preclude a trademark owner from achieving federal registration in
the first instance, but also to institute a cancellation proceeding at any
time following a successful registration.83 Thus, a trademark owner is
never free of the risk that his intellectual property rights will be swept
out from underneath his feet by a third party asserting scandalousness
or disparagement. After years of bolstering a product’s reputation and
investing in goodwill, the possibility remains that an owner will have to
re-litigate his mark’s moral wholesomeness at the risk of losing his
registration.84 In this situation, the owner would be forced to create a
new mark and spend sizeable sums informing the public of the
78

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citing Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41–43 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41, n.16 (1972)).
79
Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
80
15 U.S.C. § 1063–64 (2015).
81
LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1508.
82
Smith, supra note 45, at 456. For example, one scholar observes that under the
standard announced in Ritchie, 170 F.3d 1092, an ultra-conservative Christian group
may have standing to challenge the validity of federal protections granted to a pro-gay
rights trademark. Id.
83
§§ 1063–64.
84
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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association between his new mark and his old product.85 Thus, the
specter of a looming third party challenger significantly deters the
adoption of offensive trademarks, and the Lanham Act’s generous
standing requirements contribute to § 1052(a)’s net chilling effect on
speech.
III. PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SECTION
1052(A)
A. First Amendment Challenges
In 1981, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA)86 announced the following: “[I]t is clear that the PTO’s refusal
to register appellant’s mark does not affect his right to use it. No
conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is
suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would
not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.”87 During the thirtyplus years between McGinley and the recent grant of a rehearing en banc
in In re Tam, the Federal Circuit has continued to reiterate McGinley’s
reasoning in dismissing First Amendment challenges to § 1052(a).88
Nonetheless, trademark applicants have continued to challenge the
statute on First Amendment grounds. Some scholars contend the
provision’s constitutional basis is “crumbling.”89 The Federal Circuit’s
December 2015 ruling90 invalidating § 1052(a)’s disparagement fully
supports this notion.
B. Fifth Amendment Void-for-Vagueness Challenges
The origins of the void-for-vagueness doctrine lie in the Fifth

85

Id.
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was the predecessor to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See History of the Federal
Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special
_cpa.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). It was abolished in 1982, one year after McGinley
was decided. See id.
87
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
88
See, e.g., In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc.,
334 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
89
Phillips, supra note 9, at 66; see Lee, supra note 9, at 67 (quoting Baird, supra
note 9, at 669) (“An ‘abridgement’ may result from regulations that do not ‘ban,’
‘forbid,’ or ‘prohibit.’ In fact, an ‘abridgement’ may result from regulations that
merely ‘restrict,’ ‘limit,’ ‘impinge,’ or burden.”); Smith, supra note 45, at 468 (“[I]t is
understood that a speaker cannot be prevented from speaking in a public park just
because she can go home and say the same speech privately.”).
90
Tam, 808 F.3d at 1357–58.
86
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause.91 In simplest terms, the doctrine
requires a certain level of specificity in statutory language as a
A statute is
prerequisite to the statute’s enforceability.92
unconstitutionally vague if: (1) it fails to provide the public with fair
notice of what conduct is affected by the law; and (2) it has the
potential to “impermissibly delegate[]” policymaking duties to judicial
officials, with the “attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.”93 When a vague statute regulates or burdens expression
in a content-discriminatory manner, the statute raises special concerns
due to its chilling effect on the freedom of speech.94 The Supreme
Court has held that a more stringent vagueness test applies under these
circumstances.95 As such, when a regulation of expression is at issue,
the Court examines the regulatory language with increased scrutiny to
ensure that statutory ambiguities do not deter protected speech.96
Trademark applicants and legal scholars have attacked § 1052(a) as
unconstitutionally vague on numerous grounds.
1.

Shifting Paradigms

First, litigants and scholars have argued that society’s idea of what
is socially acceptable changes over time. Therefore, that which a
substantial composite of society considers “scandalous” or
“disparaging” is at best a moving target.97 While the TTAB has
acknowledged that it must consider ever-changing attitudes and
paradigms while ruling on a trademark’s registrability, it has also
declared, “[T]he fact that profane words may be uttered more freely
does not render them any the less profane.”98 This reasoning
essentially enables the TTAB and the PTO to ignore contemporary
attitudes at their discretion.
2.

Blurring of Statutory Definitions

Second, applicants who are denied trademark registration claim
that the PTO’s frequent practice of collapsing the scandalousness and
disparagement analyses into a single amorphous framework lends
91

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Wright, supra note 31, at 661.
93
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972).
94
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997).
95
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982).
96
F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–18 (2012).
97
Phillips, supra note 9, at 70.
98
In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
92
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further ambiguity to statutory terms which are already imprecise.99
3.

Unreliability of Dictionary Evidence

Next, litigants attack the perceived ineffectiveness of dictionaries
as evidence to show scandalousness or likely disparagement.
Applicants assert that the appropriate focus of a § 1052(a) inquiry is
not necessarily a phrase’s literal meaning, but the way in which a
substantial composite of the general public or targeted group perceives
the phrase.100 Simply put, dictionary definitions are ill-suited for this
task.101 Additionally, dictionary definitions—like social paradigms—
are subject to change over time.102 Many PTO examining attorneys
have attempted to remedy this deficiency by consulting online
dictionaries, which may lack sufficient indicia of authoritativeness and
reliability.103
4.

Lack of Clarity in Substantial Composite Standard

The Federal Circuit’s “substantial composite” standard also
possesses a lack of clarity that generates uncertainty among litigants
and scholars. The Federal Circuit has acknowledged the “inherent
difficulty in fashioning a single objective measure like a substantial
composite of the general public from the myriad of subjective
viewpoints.”104 To further aggravate the ambiguity, neither case law nor
legislative history defines a “substantial composite.”105
One
commentator has posited that the term is a “vacuous point on a
nebulous continuum . . . chosen post-hoc to justify the decisionmaker’s preconceived determination.”106 To make matters worse, the
standard has not always been universally articulated or applied.107
5.

99

Relevance of the Proposed Mark’s Surrounding

See Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 471. See, e.g., In re Old Glory Condom
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1220 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (“[O]ur finding . . . that the mark
is not scandalous subsumes a finding that the mark is not disparaging.”).
100
Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 469.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 480–81. See also Gibbons, supra note 3, at 208 (“Some dictionaries are
slower in recognizing new meanings given to existing words by disenfranchised
groups.”).
103
Gibbons, supra note 3, at 208–09.
104
In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
105
See Smith, supra note 45, at 461.
106
Gibbons, supra note 3, at 206 n.89.
107
See, e.g., In re Hepperle, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 512 (T.T.A.B. 1972) (applying an
“average purchaser” standard).
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Context
Another inconsistency deals with the relevance of a mark’s
surrounding context. As the following case law makes clear, it is
impossible to be sure of whether the PTO will consider such context
while making a § 1052(a) determination. In this regard, two
contradictory lines of precedent have developed. First, the McGinley
line of cases examines a trademark in the context of the underlying
goods or services it distinguishes.108 A conflicting line of cases
embodies the per se inquiry, focusing its § 1052(a) inquiries solely on
the trademark itself, as that mark exists independently from the
underlying goods or services.109 Examining bodies move back and
forth between the two approaches—a “schizophrenic movement” that
leads to greater unpredictability and further administrative
inconsistency.110
6.

Relevance of Applicant’s Intent

Trademark applicants have argued that the ambiguous role of
“intent” also serves as the basis for a vagueness challenge to § 1052(a).
Simply put, sometimes the TTAB considers the applicant’s intent in
creating or using a particular mark; other times, the TTAB expressly
declines to do so.111
108

See, e.g., In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 482, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (barring
registration of a sexual image partly because the mark indicated that the underlying
services involved “illicit sexual intercourse”); In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (permitting registration of a condom design
incorporating elements of the American flag partly because the applicant’s stated
intent was to raise AIDS awareness by suggesting a national duty to promote HIV
protection); In re Leo Quan, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 370, 371 (T.T.A.B. 1978)
(permitting registration of the mark, “BADASS,” because the mark had an alternative
non-vulgar meaning, serving as an acronym for “Bettencourt Acoustically Designed
Audio Sound Systems”).
109
Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter
Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered
Trademark?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 345 (1993). See, e.g., In re Red Bull G.M.B.H., 78
U.S.P.Q.2d 1375, 1381 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“It is clearly the profane connotation of the
term per se, rather than a particular meaning of the term when considered in
connection with goods . . . .”); In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863
(T.T.A.B. 1981).
110
Abdel-Khalik, supra note 34, at 211.
111
Compare In re Heeb Media, L.L.C., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071, 1077 (T.T.A.B. 2008)
(“The fact that [an] applicant has good intentions with its use of the term does not
obviate the fact that a substantial composite of the referenced group find[s] the term
objectionable. . . . Our focus must be on the perception of the referenced group and
not [the] applicant’s intentions.”), with Old Glory Condom, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216
(permitting registration of a condom design featuring American stars and stripes
largely because the applicant’s intention was not to offend or disparage, but to
redefine patriotism in a way that prioritizes the fight against AIDS).
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The Non-Role of Precedent in Section 1052(a)
Determinations

The doctrine of stare decisis—often somewhat of a cure for
statutory vagueness concerns—is entirely lacking in the context of §
1052(a) determinations. Instead, the PTO and the TTAB are free to
rule on these issues on a case-by-case basis, without using prior
decisions as a form of guidance or direction:
It is well settled that the Board must decide each application
on its own merits, and decisions regarding other registrations
do not bind either examining attorneys or this Board. The
fact that, whether because of administrative error or
otherwise, some marks have been registered even though
they may be in violation of the governing statutory standard
does not mean that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
must forgo applying that standard in all other cases.112
Without prior registrations and rejections having some
precedential force, applicants have no choice but to guess as to
whether their potentially scandalous or disparaging marks will achieve
registration.113
8.

Inconsistent Results

Finally, trademark applicants and scholars argue that § 1052(a)’s
vagueness and arbitrariness are best illustrated through the statute’s
inconsistent (and often humorous) results. For instance, as of 2011,
the PTO had received forty-one applications containing the term
“MILF.”114 Twenty were rejected; twenty were not; the remaining
application was abandoned.115 “It was a tie.”116 Perhaps Megan M.
Carpenter and Kathryn T. Murphy best expressed trademark
applicants’ frustration with these inconsistent results:
When BULLSHIT for handbags will scandalize the public,
but BIG PECKER for T-shirts will not; when CLEARLY
QUEER for clothing will register, but QUEER GEAR, also for
112

In re RK Netmedia, Inc., No. 77064737, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 389, at *27 (T.T.A.B.
May 21, 2009) (internal citations omitted).
113
LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1506. For perhaps the most egregious
example of the arbitrariness that results from the lack of stare decisis in this context, see
In re Watkins, No. 76138675, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 651 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2005)
(overturning the PTO’s refusal to register “TWATTY GIRL” following successful
registrations of “TWATTY” and “TWATTYTRAX” by the same applicant).
114
LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1478. “MILF” is a slang acronym that stands
for “mother I’d like to fuck.” Free Speech Coal. v. Holder, 957 F. Supp. 2d 564, 577
n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
115
LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1478.
116
Id. at 1481.
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clothing, will not; when TWATTY GIRL for cartoon strips is
rejected, but TWATTY for cartoon strips is not, it is time to
reexamine the structure and implementation of the section
2(a) bars.117
The foregoing illustrates that § 1052(a) grants tremendously
unfettered discretion to a small number of PTO attorneys.118 The
exercise of that discretion is entirely arbitrary, often depending largely
upon examining attorneys’ unique personal reactions to crude subject
matter.119 The resulting ambiguity is unfair to trademark applicants,
who do not have reasonable notice of whether their proposed marks
More importantly, the uncertainty
will achieve registration.120
surrounding § 1052(a) provides disincentives that contribute
significantly to the provision’s chilling effect on speech. Nevertheless,
courts and examining bodies have continued to reiterate McGinley’s
holding that § 1052(a) is “sufficiently precise to enable the PTO and
the courts to apply the law fairly and to notify a would-be registrant
that the mark he adopts will not be granted a federal registration.”121
IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
A. Introduction to the Doctrine
The first reason the Federal Circuit was correct in partially
overruling McGinley is that McGinley upheld § 1052(a) against First
Amendment challenge without considering the “unconstitutional
conditions” doctrine.122 In simplest terms, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning a
benefit’s receipt upon the waiver of a constitutional right.123 In other
words, Congress may not withhold a benefit solely because the
individual who would otherwise receive it exercised his First
Amendment right.124 In 1972, Justice Stewart—writing for a majority
of the Supreme Court in Perry v. Sindermann—set forth an especially
clear articulation of the rule:
117

Carpenter & Murphy, supra note 3, at 482.
See Smith, supra note 45, at 481.
119
See Phillips, supra note 9, at 60–61.
120
Wright, supra note 31, at 678.
121
In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
122
See id.
123
See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views)
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
124
Id.
118
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[E]ven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his
interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.125
In Perry, Plaintiff Robert Sindermann was employed as a professor
at a state college for ten years.126 Following his election as President of
the Texas Junior College Teachers’ Association, Mr. Sindermann
publicly advocated the elevation of the college from two-year to fouryear status—a position the school’s Board of Regents opposed.127 Mr.
Sindermann alleged that as a result of his choice to voice these
opinions, the Board of Regents refused to offer him a new employment
contract for the following academic year.128 The Supreme Court
remanded the case for further fact-finding, holding that the district’s
refusal to renew a public contract on these grounds would violate the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.129
Prior to Perry, the Supreme Court elaborated on its
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence in Speiser v. Randall.130 In
Speiser, a group of honorably discharged World War II veterans claimed
a veterans’ property tax exemption provided by California’s state
constitution.131 In order to qualify for the exemption, the veterans were
required to sign an oath stating they did not advocate the overthrow of
the United States government, and they would not support a foreign
government in the event of an international conflict.132 In holding that
the provision violated the veterans’ First Amendment rights, the
Supreme Court stated the following:
It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax
exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free
speech. . . . To deny an exemption to claimants who engage
in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 598.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
Id. at 514–15.
Id. at 515.
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such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State
were to fine them for this speech. . . . Congress may not by
withdrawal of privileges place limitations upon the freedom
of speech which if directly attempted would be
unconstitutional.133
In short, the Court held that the California state government’s
withholding of a tax exemption took on coercive characteristics,
thereby indirectly suppressing “dangerous ideas” by threatening to
penalize claimants for engaging in proscribed speech.134 The
excerpted passage from the Court’s holding emphasizes a key rationale
underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—that the
government may not circumvent an individual’s constitutional rights
by achieving indirectly what it is forbidden from achieving in a more
forthright manner.
B. Section 1052(a) Imposes an Unconstitutional Condition
In Perry, a school district improperly conditioned a public
contract’s renewal upon a teacher’s waiver of his right to advocate a
political position.135
In Speiser, a state government similarly
conditioned a tax exemption upon a veteran’s waiver of his right to
advocate the overthrow of the federal government.136 By way of
analogy, § 1052(a) conditions the benefits of federal trademark
registration upon an applicant’s surrender of his First Amendment
right to engage in offensive speech.137
As a preliminary matter, the benefits of federal trademark
registration are numerous, and they provide trademark owners with
indispensable advantages in litigation. First, upon registration, the
PTO publishes constructive notice of trademark ownership in The
Trademark Official Gazette, as well as in several other internationally
distributed materials.138 Next, § 1057 of the Lanham Act provides that
a registration certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of trademark
ownership and validity.139 This same provision provides federal
133

Id. at 518.
See id. at 519 (quoting American Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
402 (1950)).
135
See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text.
136
See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.
137
Phillips, supra note 9, at 67–68.
138
See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2015); Kristin D. Stout, Terrifying Trademarks and a
Scandalous Disregard for the First Amendment: Section 2(a)’s Unconstitutional Prohibition on
Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Trademarks, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 213, 218
(2015).
139
15 U.S.C. § 1057 (2010).
134
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trademark registrants with a nationwide right of priority in
cancellation proceedings, as well as an exclusive right to commercial
use of the registered mark in connection with the specified goods or
services.140 Moreover, a separate provision of the Lanham Act provides
that a registrant’s right to use his or her mark in commerce becomes
incontestable after five consecutive years of post-registration use.141
Finally, federal registrants may enlist the aid of United States Customs
to bar the importation of infringing goods,142 and they may sue in
federal courts to enforce their trademark rights upon a discovery of
infringing activities.143
While § 1052(a) does not explicitly prohibit offensive speech from
entering the marketplace, its removal of the foregoing benefits evinces
a congressional intent to discourage such speech, thereby creating a
chilling effect that threatens to deprive trademark applicants of
essential business protections.144 In other words, McGinley correctly
asserts that a § 1052(a) denial would not prevent Mr. Tam from
continuing to refer to his musical act as “The Slants” in commerce;
however, such a denial severely burdens this use by withholding rights
that are essential in the entertainment industry, thereby placing Mr.
Tam and his fellow band members at a competitive disadvantage.145
Pursuant to Perry and Speiser, it is irrelevant that Mr. Tam has no
constitutional right to federal trademark registration, and it is equally
irrelevant that the lack of registration does not prevent him from using
the speech at issue. As discussed supra,146 these cases instruct that the
purpose of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to prevent the
federal government from achieving indirectly what it is prohibited
from accomplishing directly.147
Because the First Amendment

140

Id.
Id. § 1065.
142
See id. § 1124.
143
See id. § 1121.
144
Phillips, supra note 9, at 67–68.
145
See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en
banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom.
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); see also Baird, supra note 9, at 677 (“Although it is clear that
barring and removing offensive matter from the federal registers will not proscribe the
commercial use of such matter, it certainly provides an economic disincentive to
engage in such use.”); Stout, supra note 138, at 216 (“To have an unprotected mark,
one that any other entity is free to exercise as part of its commercial or noncommercial
presence, can mean a total lack of identity. . . . [T]o be denied federal registration . . .
is not so insignificant . . . as the Federal Circuit would have us believe.”).
146
See supra notes 122–134 and accompanying text.
147
See Lee, supra note 9, at 68 (quoting Baird, supra note 9, at 693).
141
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prohibits the government from directly banning offensive speech,148 it
is impermissible for Congress to achieve an identical result by
prohibiting registration of “The Slants” under § 1052(a).149
One could argue that the government’s actions in Perry and Speiser
are distinguishable from § 1052(a) because the restrictions at issue
were absolute bars on the plaintiffs’ expressive activities. By contrast, §
1052(a) refusals extend only as far as the government’s corresponding
grant of exclusivity in a particular mark. In other words, the § 1052(a)
prohibitions are connected to the government’s grant of a monopoly
in a way that the restrictions at issue in Perry and Speiser were not related
to the renewal of an employment contract and the grant of a tax
exemption, respectively. This argument implicates the distinction
between a permissible non-subsidy and an impermissible penalty.
The argument proceeds as follows: Through § 1052(a), Congress
and the PTO are effectively saying, “We will give you a benefit, but you
can’t use that benefit to speak in a scandalous or disparaging manner.”
In Perry and Speiser, by contrast, the government is saying, “We will
grant you a benefit, provided that you refrain from engaging in certain
speech altogether.” A simplified example best illustrates the difference.
If the government were to hand an individual one hundred dollars, yet
prohibit the individual from using that one hundred dollars to engage in
political advocacy, this act would constitute a permissible nonsubsidy.150 However, if the government were to offer the same
individual one hundred dollars, while conditioning its receipt on the
individual’s agreement to refrain from political speech entirely, this
would constitute an unlawful, improperly coercive government
action.151 The former situation represents a permissible use of the
government’s spending powers, but the latter scenario imposes an
unconstitutional condition.152 Some would argue that § 1052(a) is
more closely analogous to the former situation, while Perry and Speiser
are representative of the latter.
The foregoing effort to distinguish § 1052(a) from Perry and
Speiser is without merit. A proper analysis must assess: (1) the
148

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
761–62 (1976)) (“The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted
governmental regulation.”).
149
See Lee, supra note 9, at 68.
150
Telephone Conference with Thomas Healy, Professor of Law, Seton Hall Univ.
Sch. of Law (Dec. 22, 2015).
151
Id.
152
Id.
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enormous competitive disadvantages a trademark applicant faces
when his federal registration is rejected; and (2) the economic
senselessness of foregoing the benefits that coincide with registration.
When considered in light of these practical realities, countless
prospective trademark registrants have in fact been entirely precluded
not only from registering offensive trademarks, but also from adopting
them in the first place. Together, these factors illustrate the broad
“chilling effect” that § 1052(a) has on scandalous and disparaging
speech.
Keeping the foregoing economic realities in mind, § 1052(a)
functions practically as an absolute bar against offensive speech. No
sensible businessman would invest time, money, and other resources
in developing a mark if he knew beforehand that he would be unable
to assert nationwide priority in that mark. Nor would he sacrifice the
ability to rely on advantageous presumptions in litigation. The owner
would simply select a different mark. To act otherwise would be to
forfeit rights in all geographic areas in which he is not actually using
the mark, and to allow competitors to usurp his goodwill. In short,
such a sacrifice would be economic suicide. The only realistic response
to § 1052(a), therefore, is for trademark owners to discontinue the use
of offensive marks prior to any substantial investment in goodwill.153
Importantly, this discouragement extends beyond the federal
government’s grant of a monopoly, and it permeates the commercial
marketplace. Not only is this eradication of offensive speech the
practical effect of § 1052(a), but it is also the only conceivable
congressional intent underlying the provision.
Furthermore, it is not necessarily appropriate to characterize the
restrictions at issue in Perry and Speiser as absolute bars. Nothing in the
school district’s refusal to renew an employment contract precluded
the plaintiff in Perry from continuing to advocate his political views
while seeking employment in another jurisdiction. Similarly, nothing
prohibited the plaintiffs in Speiser from continuing to advocate the
overthrow of the federal government while seeking to qualify for a
different tax exemption. In a sense, the availability of alternatives in
153

The Supreme Court has held that similar “do-or-die” scenarios are
impermissible. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70–71 (1936) (“The regulation
is not . . . voluntary. The farmer . . . may refuse to comply, but the price . . . is the loss
of benefits. The amount offered is . . . sufficient to exert pressure . . . to agree to the
proposed regulation. The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power
to coerce or destroy.”); see also Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593
(1926) (“In reality, the carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the rock
and the whirlpool—an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood
or submit to a requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden.”).
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Perry and Speiser makes the government actions in those cases less
susceptible to challenge under the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. By contrast, a trademark applicant facing a § 1052(a)
rejection has no available alternatives. The certificate of federal
registration is a unique right offered solely by the PTO, and the
deprivation of its benefits forces sensible businessmen to completely
forego using their marks in commerce.
V. SECTION 1052(A)’S FIRST AMENDMENT INTRUSION IS NO
LONGER JUSTIFIED BY CONGRESS’S SPENDING POWER.
A. Congress’s Spending Power
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (“the Spending Clause”) grants
Congress broad discretion to tax the public and spend public funds to
promote the general welfare.154 This means that when the federal
government appropriates funds from the public treasury to initiate a
program, the Spending Clause grants Congress the authority to
establish and define the limits of that program.155 In other words,
Congress may insist that funds from the federal treasury are spent in
the congressionally authorized manner and for congressionally
authorized purposes.156 This power occasionally includes the authority
to impose conditions that affect recipients’ constitutional rights.157
Thus, there exists an inherent tension between applying the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and protecting Congress’s ability
to direct government spending.158
Pursuant to its Spending Clause authority, Congress may
condition the receipt of federal funds upon the satisfaction of
objectives that are not included within its enumerated powers.159
Congress may also be selective with regard to what it considers to
promote the “general welfare”; for example, Congress may selectively
fund certain activities if it feels those activities are in the public’s best

154

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 196 (2003) (citing Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
156
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Am. Library Ass’n, 539
U.S. at 211–12), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert.
granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
157
Id. (quoting Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2321, 2328 (2013)).
158
See id. at 577.
159
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
155
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interest, but may decline to subsidize other programs that propose
alternative solutions to the same problem.160 In doing so, Congress
does not necessarily engage in unlawful viewpoint discrimination;
rather, it simply chooses to “fund one activity to the exclusion of
another.”161 Typically, if a recipient objects to a condition placed upon
the receipt of federal funds, the sole remedy is to decline the funds
and seek financial support elsewhere.162 This remains the case even
when a recipient’s objection is that the condition violates his
constitutional rights to free speech.163
B. Limitations on Congress’s Spending Power
While Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause is very
broad, there are some checks, balances, and limitations on that power.
For instance, Congress is required to exercise its spending authority
only in pursuit of the general welfare.164 Additionally, Congress may
not impose conditions in an attempt to regulate speech that is
unrelated to the program at issue.165 Congress is also prohibited from
encouraging others to violate the Constitution.166 None of these
limitations appear problematic with regard to § 1052(a). But two
further restrictions on Congress’s spending power are relevant in
assessing § 1052(a)’s constitutionality: (1) the requirement that
Congress exercise its spending powers only with respect to funds that
belong to the public treasury;167 and (2) the requirement that Congress
refrain from “coercing” recipients to behave in a certain way.168
C. Trademark Application Fees Are Private Expenditures Unconnected to
160

Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
Id.
162
All. for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
163
Id.
164
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); Butler, 297 U.S. at 66). In Dole, the Supreme Court
articulated several factors courts should consider in deciding whether Congress has
exceeded its authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. Although the Court has
never expressly held that the “Dole factors” apply when Congress provides financial
incentives to individuals, the Court has implicitly considered similar factors under
these circumstances. See, e.g., Butler, 297 U.S. 1.
165
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 578 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views)
(quoting All. for Open Soc’y, 133 S. Ct. at 2328), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600
F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as
corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
166
Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
167
See, e.g., Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n,
760 F.3d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 2014).
168
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
161
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the Public Treasury.
First, there is the most blatant and egregious way in which §
1052(a) exceeds Congress’s spending authority. Due to drastic
changes in the PTO’s structure since McGinley was decided, federal
trademark registration proceedings no longer implicate public
treasury funds. At the time McGinley was decided, trademark
registrations were funded primarily by federal tax dollars,169 and the
case was necessarily decided against this background. As such,
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause at least arguably
justified the resulting intrusions upon applicants’ First Amendment
rights.170 Since Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1991, however, trademark registrations have been funded
entirely through user fees paid by the applicants themselves.171 As one
judge has stated, “Unlike tangible property, a subsidy, or a tax
exemption, bestowal of trademark registration does not result in a
direct loss to any property or money from the public fisc.”172 Therefore,
the Spending Clause justification no longer has merit.
The
significance of this change is best illustrated through two federal cases
that elaborate on the “public treasury” limitation: Rust v. Sullivan173 and
Department of Texas, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States v. Texas
Lottery Commission.174
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Department of Human Services
promulgated regulations prohibiting Title X fund recipients from
engaging in abortion-related activities, including counseling and
referral services.175 Recipient healthcare providers challenged the
constitutionality of the regulations, alleging Title X conditioned the
receipt of federal funds upon the relinquishment of First Amendment
rights—a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.176 The
United States Supreme Court held that the regulations did not abridge
the recipients’ First Amendment rights.177 Rather, this was a
permissible non-subsidy—a perfect example of Congress choosing to
“fund one activity to the exclusion of another,” while simultaneously
ensuring that the funds it provided were not used for purposes outside
169

See Tam, 785 F.3d at 580.
See id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
174
Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Texas Lottery Comm’n, 760
F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2014).
175
Rust, 500 U.S. at 178–81.
176
See id. at 181.
177
See id. at 192–200.
170
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the federal program’s scope.178 An important factor in the Court’s
decision was that Title X subsidies were moneys obtained directly from
the public fisc.179
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reached the opposite result in Texas Lottery Commission. In that
case, the Texas state government promulgated the regulation at issue.
However, the Fifth Circuit found that the Texas state government’s
spending power was sufficiently analogous to that of the federal
government’s to warrant judicial review under an Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1 framework.180 The case dealt with a 1980 amendment to the
Texas state constitution, which exempted qualified charitable
organizations from state gambling prohibitions, provided the
organizations refrained from using net gambling proceeds to engage
in political advocacy.181 A group of affected charities sued the state’s
lottery commission, alleging an abridgement of their First Amendment
rights.182 The Fifth Circuit ruled that the regulatory regime granted a
license, which is separate and distinct from a government subsidy.183
The charities received no funds from the public fisc, and the
restrictions on speech therefore were subject to unrestricted analysis
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.184
The court
distinguished the licenses from tax exemptions, which constitute a
form of government subsidy administered.185 Here, however, no public
monies were involved, and the only government “grant” was the grant
of authority to conduct an activity that would otherwise be illegal186—
essentially a form of protection against criminal prosecution or civil
lawsuit.
Section 1052(a) is analogous to the provisions of the Texas state
constitution at issue in Texas Lottery Commission, because a trademark
registration certificate costs the federal government nothing.187 As a
178

Id. at 174–75.
See id. at 198.
180
See Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 760
F.3d 427, 434 (5th Cir. 2014).
181
Id. at 431 (citing Bingo Enabling Act, TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 2001.001–.657
(West 2014)).
182
Id.
183
See id. at 437.
184
Id.
185
See id. at 436–37.
186
Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 760 F.3d at 436.
187
See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 580 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views)
(“Like the programs in Bullfrog and Texas Lottery Commission, the system of trademark
registration is a regulatory regime, not a government subsidy program.”), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d
179
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form of protection from trademark infringement and unfair
competition, the certificate functions as an occupational license,
rather than a government subsidy. The lack of federal funds also
distinguishes a § 1052(a) denial from the Title X regulations at issue
in Rust v. Sullivan, which simply specified how federal funds were to be
used if and when granted to a recipient program.188 Here, the federal
government grants no such funds to a trademark applicant, so similar
specifications are unwarranted. In fact, numerous judges and
commentators have observed that more government resources are
expended following § 1052(a) rejections than could ever be spent on
their approvals.189
Although trademark registrations are fully funded by privatized
applicant fees, it remains the case that the government inevitably
spends some public funds on facilitating the examining process and
otherwise allowing a litigant to enforce his rights.190 Examples of these
expenditures include public employee salaries, pensions, health
insurance, other benefits, and court costs.191 However, this routine dip
into the public treasury is too attenuated from Lanham Act benefits to
justify § 1052(a)’s First Amendment intrusion under Congress’s
spending powers.192 A holding otherwise would implicate the
Spending Clause with regard to every benefit the government
provides, thereby transforming the coercive denial of those benefits
into permissible non-subsidies.
For instance, if the government’s act of registering a trademark
qualified as a subsidy, then one could argue the government subsidizes
the author of a book when it grants him or her a copyright.193 The
government could then circumvent the First Amendment’s
prohibitions and ban the registration of literary works tending to
offend scattered segments of the public. If Congress had decided to
deny the benefits and incentives of copyright registration to literary
works that contain scandalous and/or disparaging material, it may
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 30
(2016).
188
See supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text.
189
See, e.g., Tam, 785 F.3d at 583 (Moore, J., additional views); In re McGinley, 660
F.2d 481, 487 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., dissenting) (“More ‘public funds’ are being
expended in the prosecution of this appeal than would ever result from the
registration of the mark.”); Phillips, supra note 9, at 68–69 (“It seems likely that more
governmental time and resources are needlessly spent with office actions and appellate
work targeted at barring scandalous marks than is saved by their proscription.”).
190
See Tam, 785 F.3d at 580.
191
Id. See also Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
192
Tam, 785 F.3d at 580–81.
193
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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have deprived the world of such great works as Mark Twain’s The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, J.D. Salinger’s A Catcher in the Rye, and D.
H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterly’s Lover. Pursuant to the government’s
position in Tam, Congress could also use its spending power to
regulate the content displayed during parades. After all, most parades
take place on public property and require licenses or permits. The
offices that issue these licenses or permits are run by public employees,
and public tax dollars fund those employees’ salaries and benefits.
Obviously, the government’s argument becomes absurd when
taken to these extremes. That is because the costs the government
incurs in registering trademarks are the same incidental costs that
accompany any system of governmental registration, e.g., copyrights,
patents, property deeds, etc.194 In deciding whether a tension exists
between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and Congress’s
spending power, courts only consider whether the conditioned benefits
are paid for with public treasury funds, not whether the programs are
subsidized in more routine, indirect manners.195
An opposing argument exists in the notion that PTO user fees
become public treasury funds once the government possesses them. But
this argument fails to recognize the distinction between a public “tax”
and a private “fee.” The policy underlying a taxation system is that
citizens who benefit from a government’s existence should pay their
fair shares to maintain that government.196 Importantly, there is little
to no connection between an individual taxpayer and the entity that
decides how to spend the collected revenue.197 A tax provides the
treasury with public funds that it may allocate to any lawful
governmental purpose, and there is no guarantee that those funds will
directly benefit the taxpayer.198 By contrast, a government entity
collects a “commodity charge” or a “user fee” in exchange for a specific
product or service it renders to the paying consumer.199 In this latter
situation, protections ensure that the fee’s proceeds are used
exclusively to finance the goods or services in the transaction at hand,
and the sums are not used for general government purposes.200
Although funds do not have to satisfy the technical definition of a
194

Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1353–54.
196
See Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335,
337 (2003).
197
Gruen v. Tax Comm’n, 211 P.2d 651, 651–70 (Wash. 1949), overruled in part by
State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 384 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1963).
198
See Spitzer, supra note 196, at 338–39.
199
Id. at 343.
200
Id.
195
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tax to constitute “funds within the public treasury’s possession,” the
foregoing distinction is helpful in determining whether the federal
government possesses the funds at issue. While labels are not always
dispositive, it seems that in the context of federal trademarks,
registration fees are just what they purport to be: private fees. First,
the payments are not compulsory. Second, a direct relationship exists
between the payment made and the service received in exchange for
that payment: a PTO registration certificate. Most importantly,
trademark applicants do not pay these fees so the federal government
may spend them on various programs at its discretion. Instead, these
fees cover the costs of operating the PTO.201 In fact, patent and
trademark registration fees together cover the entirety of that cost.202
There is a small catch. The amounts collected from patent and
trademark registration fees actually constitute about 110% of the cost
of running the PTO.203
Through the federal government’s
controversial “surcharge” mechanism, the remaining surplus used to
be “siphoned off” to finance other government programs.204 This
suggests the government exercises at least some ownership and control
over patent and trademark registration fees. But in 1998, the
surcharge experiment expired.205 Now, theoretically, the remaining
“extra” funds are made available to the PTO in the following fiscal year
on a rollover basis.206 While the diversion of these remaining funds to
other federal programs has continued despite the expiration of
Congress’s surcharge mechanism, such diversion is widely perceived as
fundamentally unfair to patent and trademark holders.207 For this
reason, Congress has initiated movements to prevent further incidents
of this diversion.208
201

Report to the House of Delegates, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2,
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/106legis/ptouserfee.
doc.
202
Id.
203
See id. at 2.
204
Id.
205
See id. at 3.
206
See id. at 4.
207
See Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 201, at 2 (“This practice of diversion
of USPTO user fees to fund unrelated government activities is unfair to those who pay
the fees and is damaging to our nation’s economic health and progress. It must be
stopped.”); USPTO Funding, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, https://www.ipo.org/index
.php/advocacy/hot-topics/uspto-funding/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (“IPO has long
advocated adequate funding for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and
seeks to ensure that the USPTO has access to all user fees collected each year. A fully
funded USPTO is a key to innovation and job creation and to strengthening the U.S.
economy.”).
208
See, e.g., Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 1832, 114th Cong. (2015); Patent Fee
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D. Section 1052(a) Functions as a Coercive Penalty.
Even assuming arguendo that the federal trademark registration
system implicates public funds, the statute must be invalidated as
unduly coercive. When Congress conditions the receipt of federal
benefits, it may not do so to the extent that the condition operates as
a compulsion.209 In this regard, a fine line distinguishes a permissible
non-subsidy from a coercive penalty. Two seminal Supreme Court
cases demonstrate this distinction: South Dakota v. Dole,210 and United
States v. Butler.211
In Dole, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a federal law
that withheld five percent of federal highway funds from states that
permitted persons less than twenty-one years of age to purchase
alcohol.212 The Court did not find that the threatened withholding of
funds was sufficiently coercive to amount to a compulsion, thereby
exceeding the bounds of Congress’ Spending Clause authority.213
Instead, the Court found that the law functioned merely as a financial
inducement; while each state had an incentive to comply with
Congress’ requested minimum drinking age, it also retained a realistic
choice as to whether such compliance was worthwhile.214 Of course,
the states remained free to seek highway revenue from other sources.
In United States v. Butler, by contrast, the Supreme Court
invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act as an abuse of Congress’
spending power, partly because the Act attempted to use economic
pressure as a form of coercion.215 The legislation imposed a
“processing tax” on agricultural commodity producers and
redistributed the tax’s proceeds to producers who agreed to reduce

Integrity Act, S. 2146, 113th Cong. (2014); Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 3349, 113th
Cong. (2013); Patents and Trademarks Encourage New Technology Jobs Act, H.R.
2582, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. REP. NO. 106-1048 (2001).
209
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
210
Dole, 483 U.S. 203.
211
Butler, 297 U.S. 1.
212
See Dole, 483 U.S. 203.
213
See id. at 211 (“When we consider . . . that all South Dakota would lose if she
adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds
otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to
coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.”).
214
See id. at 211–12 (“Here Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to
the States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would otherwise choose.
But the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the States not merely in
theory but in fact.”).
215
See Butler, 297 U.S. 1.
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their net acreage.216 Unlike the South Dakota state government in Dole,
the Supreme Court held that the individual farmers in Butler retained
no realistic choice other than to accept the funds and reduce their
output of crops.217 The amount of funds offered created sufficient
pressure to amount to an compulsion, thus depriving the farmers of
any viable alternatives. The Court held that the “choice” at issue
positioned each crop producer “between the rock and the whirlpool,”
granting him “an ‘option’ to forego a privilege which may be vital to
his livelihood or submit to a requirement which may constitute an
intolerable burden.”218
Section 1052(a)’s prohibitions function as coercive penalties. Dole
and Butler illustrate that the primary factor distinguishing a nonsubsidy from a penalty is whether the affected parties retain a realistic
choice to decline the benefit in question and seek its equivalent
elsewhere.219 Simply put, rejected trademark applicants have no such
choice. All funds—to a certain extent—are fungible; in this regard,
money is distinguishable from a certificate of federal trademark
registration. The latter is a unique bundle of rights offered solely by
the PTO. A rejected applicant has nowhere else to turn if his mark
fails to conform to § 1052(a)’s arbitrary standards. Thus, the
traditional remedy of declining a benefit and seeking its equivalent
elsewhere is unavailable.
VI. CENTRAL HUDSON: WHY DOES IT ALL MATTER?
Because § 1052(a) imposes an unconstitutional condition that is
unjustifiable as a non-subsidy, the provision must withstand
constitutional scrutiny in order to pass muster.220 The initial matter to
be decided is what level of scrutiny applies.
As discussed supra,221 Mr. Tam’s trademark goes beyond merely
identifying his musical act. Rather, his stated intent is to “reclaim” and
“take ownership” of traditionally offensive Asian stereotypes, thereby
conveying that Asian Americans should stand strong and be proud of
their cultural heritage.222 Mr. Tam’s trademark and accompanying
216

Id. at 53–57.
Id. at 70–71.
218
Id. at 72 (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593
(1926)).
219
See supra notes 212–218 and accompanying text.
220
See Davis, supra note 109, at 368 (“A finding that Section 2(a) properly should
be held to satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment is not, of course, dispositive
of the separate and independent issue of whether it does satisfy those standards.”).
221
See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
222
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views), reh’g
217
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message implicate racial, societal, and political issues—all of which
comprise the “heartland” of speech entitled to First Amendment
protection.223
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s disposition of Tam demonstrates
that § 1052(a) contains viewpoint-based restrictions of speech subject
to strict scrutiny.224 Pursuant to § 1052(a), it is permissible for a
trademark applicant to register marks that refer to a particular group
or idea in a positive way, but it is impermissible for the same applicant
to register a mark that refers to the same group or idea in a harmful,
scandalous, or disparaging way.225 A listener’s probable reaction to
expression is not a content-neutral basis for regulation;226 rather, this
criterion depends entirely on the content of the speaker’s message.
The government does not dispute that § 1052(a)’s purpose is to deter
the vilest messages from ever entering commerce.227 This objective
solidifies § 1052(a) as a classic example of a restraint that targets
expressive content, thereby threatening to eliminate disfavored views
from the marketplace of ideas. However, because § 1052(a) fails to
survive even the intermediate scrutiny applied to commercial speech
restrictions, an argument for strict scrutiny becomes largely irrelevant.
As one of the single most important commercial assets a manufacturer
or seller can own, a trademark undoubtedly falls within the definition
of commercial speech.228 In Central Hudson, the United States Supreme
Court defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”229 Similarly, in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the
Court described commercial speech as involving the “dissemination of
information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what

en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc,
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S.
Ct. 30 (2016).
223
Id.
224
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227, 2230 (2015) (holding content-based speech restrictions are
subject to strict scrutiny, and government discrimination among viewpoints is a
particularly egregious form of content discrimination); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining strict scrutiny is necessary when a regulation burdens
speech based on the government’s disapproval of the speakers message).
225
See Tam, 785 F.3d at 582.
226
See Forsyth City v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992).
227
See Appellee’s En Banc Brief at 1–3, Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (No. 14-1203).
228
Lee, supra note 9, at 71.
229
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
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reason, and at what price.”230 The Court has at least once identified
trademarks as commercial speech.231 After all, trademarks serve as
commercial identifiers—symbols, words, pictures, and/or logos used
to distinguish a company’s goods from those manufactured by
others.232
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part
framework to determine the constitutionality of commercial speech
restrictions. First, in order to come within the ambit of First
Amendment protection, the speech at issue must concern lawful
activity.233 Second, the speech must not be misleading.234 Third, courts
must determine whether the government interest underlying the
restriction qualifies as “substantial.”235 Finally, the regulation must
“directly advance” the asserted interest in a manner that is not “more
extensive than necessary.”236 As shown below, § 1052(a) fails to
withstand intermediate scrutiny because the government is unable to
assert a substantial interest in restricting scandalous or disparaging
commercial speech.237 Therefore, it is unnecessary to reach the third
and
fourth
steps
of
the
Central
Hudson
framework.
Although the Lanham Act’s legislative history provides no indication
of Congress’s intent in enacting § 1052(a), courts and scholars have
manufactured three plausible purposes: (1) a desire to protect the
public from offensive trademarks; (2) a desire to refrain from
“stamping the government’s imprimatur” on an offensive mark; and
(3) a congressional choice not to subsidize offensive material with
federal funds.238
Supreme Court precedent forecloses use of the first proposed
interest—protection of the public welfare.239 It is a fundamental
230

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).
232
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2015).
233
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
To date, no court has considered Central Hudson in the context of a § 1052(a)
appeal. Whether or not a “substantial government interest” for the provision exists is
at best ambiguous. See Stout, supra note 138, at 241 (positing that when viewed
collectively, the possible governmental interests in support of § 1052(a) are too weak
to justify the provision’s abridgement of protected commercial speech).
238
See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 582–85 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional
views), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on
reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub
nom. 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); Phillips, supra note 9, at 68–69.
239
See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571–72 (2011).
231
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precept of First Amendment jurisprudence that the government may
not suppress or burden speech merely because it is offensive to some
viewers or listeners.240 Additionally, the government continues to argue
that the refusal to register a trademark does not remove the mark from
commerce or otherwise limit its access to the public.241 It is hypocritical
for the government to argue that a § 1052(a) denial will not prevent
an applicant from using his speech in commerce, while also arguing
that such a denial will protect the public from offensive material.
The second proposed interest—the concern that trademark
registration signifies the government’s “stamp of approval” on an
offensive mark—has been largely discounted by relevant case law. For
instance, in In re Old Glory Condom Corp., the TTAB stated the following:
The duty of this Office under the Trademark Act in reviewing
applications for registration is nothing more and nothing
less than to register those marks that are functioning to
identify and distinguish goods and services in the
marketplace . . . . Just as the issuance of a trademark
registration by this Office does not amount to a government
endorsement of the quality of the goods to which the mark
is applied, the act of registration is not a government
imprimatur or pronouncement that the mark is a ‘good’ one
in an aesthetic, or any analogous, sense.242
In a manner consistent with Old Glory Condom, scholars agree that
trademark registration should not signify political support for the
underlying mark any more than patent registration signifies an
endorsement of the underlying invention.243
The third proposed government interest in support of §
1052(a)—a congressional choice not to use public funds to subsidize
offensive speech—no longer carries any weight. In 1981, the CCPA
stated that “the prohibition against registering scandalous marks was
not ‘an attempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the
Congress that such marks not occupy the time, services, and use of
funds of the federal government.’”244 The court provided a multitude
of ways in which the federal government spent funds while registering
a trademark.245 However, this justification for the abridgement of
240

See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 60 (1983).
See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), abrogated in part by In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
242
In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 1993).
243
See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 9, at 69.
244
LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 29, at 1482 (quoting McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486).
245
This list included the following: maintaining public records; publishing notice
in an official publication; enlisting U.S. Customs to block the importation of infringing
241

RASO (DO NOT DELETE)

970

4/16/2017 1:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:935

speech no longer stands on firm ground. Federal trademark
registration is now funded almost entirely by user fees, and therefore
costs the government very little money.246 In fact, multiple courts have
stated that in light of the § 1052(a) appeal process, it frequently costs
the government more money to refuse registration than it does to
allow it.247
VII. CONCLUSION
It is easy to garner sympathy for those personally offended by
scandalous or disparaging trademarks, but the Lanham Act is not a
proper vehicle through which these persons can constitutionally
alleviate their frustrations. Scholars have suggested that perhaps a
more appropriate remedy lies within the operation of a free,
unrestrained marketplace.248 In any event, the First Amendment
protects not only harmless expression, but hurtful expression too.249 If
the rationales underlying freedom of speech are to have any true
meaning, the American people must tolerate some insulting speech in
order to provide adequate breathing room for the exercise of essential
freedoms.250 The fact that Mr. Tam offended the public’s moral
sensibilities merely demonstrates the expressive power of his band’s
name, as well as the expressive power of trademarks generally.251
In denying registration to “scandalous” or “disparaging”
trademarks, § 1052(a) significantly abridges trademark applicants’
First Amendment rights. Although the Spending Clause authorizes
Congress to condition federal benefits upon the recipients’
relinquishment of rights under certain circumstances, § 1052(a) fails
to meet these criteria. That is because the provision is unduly coercive,

goods; and providing registrants with access to federal district courts. McGinley, 660
F.2d at 486.
246
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 583 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Moore, J., additional views), reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and on reh’g en banc,
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S.
Ct. 30 (2016).
247
See, e.g., McGinley, 660 F.2d at 487 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
248
See Elder Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 454, 477–78 (2014) (“Economic considerations by themselves—without
the law’s intervention—could discourage use of offensive marks, as many customers
would avoid purchasing an offensively marked product or service.”); Lee, supra note
9, at 80 n.51 (“If a majority of the public is offended by a mark, [then] they are not
likely . . . to buy the goods bearing that mark. Therefore, it is not likely that anyone
would use a mark that was truly offensive to a majority of the population.”).
249
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).
250
See id.
251
See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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and it fails to implicate federal funds to a constitutionally adequate
degree. As an abridgement of commercial speech, § 1052(a) must
withstand intermediate scrutiny to pass muster. The statute does not
survive intermediate scrutiny, because the government has failed to
articulate a substantial interest in regulating scandalous and
disparaging material in this manner. Therefore, the Supreme Court
must invalidate § 1052(a) as unconstitutional.

